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COMMENTS ON THE JUVENILE COURT
By CHARLES E. MOYLAN, SR.*
INTRODUCTION
The first juvenile court, established in Chicago in 1899,' was the
result of the dedicated work of sound lawyers who realized the need
for a specialized court to treat the problems of the juvenile offender.
The enabling statutes providing for the court removed it from the orbit
of the criminal system. The proceedings were to be of a civil nature,
and the rigorous rules of evidence were relaxed in the discretion of
the judge. The entire structure of the court was designed to handle
different demands than those imposed on the ordinary criminal tribunal,
and it was accordingly established as a branch of an existing equity
court. The Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Division for Juvenile
Causes, followed this original pattern.
The juvenile court thus became a specialized court, founded on the
philosophy of individualized justice and combining in a legal tribunal
both law and the social sciences dealing with human behavior. The
blood lines of such a court go back through several centuries to the
beginnings of equity jurisprudence. When the English Chancellors
took jurisdiction over a child, they acted for the state as parens patriae,
and the child become a ward of the court. Prevention of injury is an
historical and integral characteristic of equity jurisprudence. The long-
armed Court of Equity, with its emphasis on preventive techniques, is
thus a peculiarly appropriate tribunal for handling cases of delinquent
and neglected children.
These innovations in the handling of the juvenile offender estab-
lished by the juvenile statutes prompted a questioning of the court's
authority to separate parent and child. Not only the separation, but
also the procedure by which it was accomplished necessitated a need
for judicial reflection on the extent to which the state could assume the
role of parent. In a leading case decided in 1928,2 the Mississippi
Supreme Court ruled that when the parents had failed in their duty to
educate and raise the child so as to conform to society's standard of
behavior, the state could intercede to help rehabilitate the child and
prevent injury to society, even if separation of parent and child was the
result. These same principles were recognized by the Maryland Court
of Appeals even before the first juvenile court was established in Mary-
land.' In Roth and Boyle v. House of Refuge,4 the court concurred in
* Judge, Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Division for Juvenile Causes. A.B.
1917, Western Maryland College; LL.B. 1924, University of Maryland.
1. The latest version of this law may be found in SmiTH-HURD ILLINOIS ANNO-
TATMD STATUTEs ch. 23, §§ 2001-2036 (1958).
2. Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928), 60 A.L.R. 1325 (1929).
3. The first Juvenile Court in Maryland was established in 1902, Laws of Mary-
land ch. 611 (1902).
4. 31 Md. 329 (1869). The court did not have the exact question of the right to
detain minors in a House of Refuge before it. However, the majority judge stated
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the opinion of a Pennsylvania case5 which had discussed a House of
Refuge, and held, "The House of Refuge is not a prison, but a school
where reformation and not punishment is the end; ... to this end, may
not the natural parents, when unequal to the task of education, or un-
worthy of it, be superceeded by the parens patriae, a common guardian
of the community?"' 6
The courts were also given an extended opportunity to examine
the underlying principles and purposes on which the juvenile court
was based because of the many challenges that were asserted to the
constitutionality of juvenile proceedings. Such analysis led many courts
to adopt the view that the standards applicable to juvenile courts are
not the same as those for an ordinary criminal court.7 The opinion of
the Utah Supreme Court in Mill v. Browns is typical of this attitude.
In emphasizing the difference between the goals of juvenile and criminal
courts, the court noted:
Such laws are most salutary, and are in no sense criminal and
not intended as punishment, but are calculated to save the child
from becoming a criminal. The whole and only object of such laws
is to provide the child with an environment such as will save him
to the state and society as a useful and law-abiding citizen, and
to give him the educational requirements necessary to attain the
end. To effect this purpose some restraint is necessary.'
Among the most serious objections raised to the procedure used
in juvenile cases is that the defendant in many instances is not afforded
protection against self-incrimination and double jeopardy. Many juris-
dictions do not recognize the right against self-incrimination in juvenile
cases,' ° in accord with their belief in differentiating juvenile and crimi-
nal court procedure. As to double jeopardy, the Maryland Court of
Appeals has implemented a similar philosophy in considering the ques-
tion of whether an adjudication of delinquency places the offender in
jeopardy so that a subsequent criminal trial would be double jeopardy.
Moquin v. State" held that a prior adjudication by the Montgomery
County Juvenile Court that the defendant, a sixteen year old boy, was
a delinquent child was not a bar to a subsequent waiver of jurisdiction
by the juvenile court and criminal prosecution in the circuit court for
that the power conferred in relation to detention did not conflict with the Maryland
Constitution, and he had appended the Crouse decision to his opinion for a statement
of the reasons on which he relied.
5. Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 9 (1839).
6. Id. at 11.
7. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Shoemake, 213 Miss. 374, 57 So. 2d 267 (1952). For
other cases upholding juvenile court statutes against attack on constitutional grounds,
see Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 At. 678 (1923) ; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213
Pa. 48, 62 Atl. 198 (1905); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
8. 31 Utah 473, 88 Pac. 609 (1907).
9. 88 Pac. at 613.
10. For a collection of cases considering the applicability of this rule, see Annot.,
43 A.L.R.2d 1128, 1133-35 (1955).
11. 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958).
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the same offenses. The court held that the rule of double jeopardy is
usually applicable only when the first prosecution involves a trial before
a criminal court or at least a court empowered to impose punishment,
and so did not govern the situation in the case.' 2
In furtherance of the effort to relieve the juvenile defendant of any
criminal stigma, juvenile courts do not use a formal arrest warrant.
Citation is adjudged an appropriate substitution for a warrant, and
there is no arrest in the technical sense. When the juvenile is charged
as a delinquent, the court at once takes him into custody, pending an
investigation by a member of the court staff. The law of arrest is thus
inapplicable to juvenile procedure in most jurisdictions," and the com-
plex constitutional issues regarding arrests are avoided.
While the juvenile court was able to successfully withstand vir-
tually every constitutional attack upon its informal hearings during the
first fifty years of its existence, the very informality of the hearing in
many jurisdictions resulted in grave abuses. The inherent right of all
litigants to fair treatment was at times ignored. In some cases parents
did not know until they arrived in court the offense with which their
children were charged. Many youths were taken from their homes and
sent to training schools as delinquents on the sole basis of hearsay
evidence gathered by well-intentioned social workers. The youths
would never be confronted with their accusers at a hearing and were
denied the right of cross-examination. Such inexcusable short cuts
and looseness too frequently made a shambles of the administration of
justice. Fortunately, since about 1950, the pendulum has swung in
the other direction.
The appellate courts have responded to the abrogation of juvenile
rights by reversing many adjudications where less than fair treatment
was afforded the defendant. Failure to allow bail in a pending juvenile
case,14 allowing the use of hearsay evidence,'" use of unsworn testimony
against the defendant' 6 and absence of confrontation and opportunity
for cross-examination 17 have all been grounds for reversal. While the
courts have been willing to accept somewhat more flexible and informal
procedures in the juvenile court, these examples emphasize that an in-
formal atmosphere is not a license for the judge to treat lightly the
safeguards to which juvenile defendants are entitled. However, while
enforcing procedural protection in juvenile court hearings, these de-
cisions do not represent a retreat from the earlier cases holding the
juvenile statutes constitutional.
An interesting problem is raised in the area of counsel for indigent
juveniles and their families. The United States Constitution provides
in part in the Sixth Amendment that, "In all criminal prosecutions,
12. Id. at 528, 140 A. 2d at 916. The court took the position that the juvenile
act did not contemplate punishment, but rather an attempt to rehabilitate.
13. Comment, The Juvenile Court - Benevolence In the Star Chamber, 50 J.
CRIM. L., C.&P.S. 464, 468 (1960).
14. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960).
15. In re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954).
16. In re Ross, 45 Wash. 2d 654, 277 P.2d 335 (1954).
17. In re Green, 123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952).
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the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense." The Supreme Court's historic decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright s held that the right to counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, extends to defendants in the states' criminal courts
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
case has prompted wide discussion as to whether an indigent juvenile
committed to a training school, without having counsel appointed for
him, is deprived of "his liberty" without due process of law.' 9 The
District of Columbia has recognized that a juvenile is entitled to the
assistance of counsel, and in the case of indigents, counsel should
be appointed. °
To institute such a procedure naturally involves a substantial
expense. Maryland, as well as most states, has no statutory provision
or funds for such an innovation. The judges in most of them feel, I
believe, that appointment of counsel is not a prerequisite to due process
in juvenile proceedings. Many of them are pragmatists. They have
misgivings about the inevitable danger of unconscionable delays, un-
wieldy numbers of requests for postponement of cases, and vastly in-
creased backlogs of pending cases such as plague and handicap so
many of our criminal courts. The trend, nevertheless, is toward the
appointment of counsel for indigent juveniles.
It might be well for the Juvenile Court Committees of the State
and Baltimore City Bar Associations to study and consider this question
of appointed counsel for indigent juveniles in their next reports to
their respective Associations.2
JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE IN BALTIMORE
Can a proper balance be struck between the basic philosophy of
the juvenile court and its underlying informality, and the maintenance
of procedural safeguards of due process, guaranteeing fundamental fair-
ness in all hearings, criminal or civil? Some references to the twenty-
year efforts of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Division for
Juvenile Causes, to strike this balance may serve a useful purpose.
Proceedings are begun in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City,
Division for Juvenile Causes, by the filing of a petition. The petition
follows equity procedure and is drawn in simple language designed
18. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
19. The Standard Juvenile Court Act, 5 NPPA J. 105 (1959), provides for
representation by counsel as follows:
Prior to the start of a hearing, the court shall inform the parents, guardian
or custodian, and the child when it is appropriate to do so, that they have a right
to be represented by a counsel at every stage of the proceeding. If any of them
requests it but is found by the court to be financially unable to employ counsel,
counsel shall be appointed by the Court and, if necessary, compensated out of the
funds in the court's budget. Upon a final adverse disposition if the parents or
guardian is without counsel, the court shall inform them, and the child if it is
appropriate to do so, of the right to appeal. ...
20. In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955); Shioutakon v. District of
Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).




to be easily and clearly understood by the child and his parents.22 The
State is not a party to the proceeding, as in criminal cases, and the
language used is not that associated with criminal prosecutions. The
petition attempts to inform both child and parent of the specific nature
of the complaint, and a copy of the petition is served upon the child
and his parents, as the Rules of the Court require.
Hearsay evidence in the main is banned because the crystallized
experience of centuries has proved such evidence to be of a usually
undependable nature. The judge himself must rule out such evidence,
as the juvenile and his parents, usually unrepresented by counsel, are
generally unfamiliar with rules of evidence. There is no screening of
petitions by social workers. All petitions are docketed and are heard
by the judge or one of the court's two Masters in Chancery who usually
handle preliminary hearings and make recommendations to the judge.
All cases are heard in the court room, and the issue of delinquency is
decided on the evidence produced. In all delinquency cases, the court
enters a plea for the youth denying all allegations of the petition. There
is no formal or other arraignment. Witnesses in support of the petition
are called to testify in all cases and are subject to cross-examination
by either the parents or the judge where the youth is without legal
representation. No case is decided on a plea or admission by the party
charged; all hearings require confrontation, and all witnesses are sworn.
The author has found that the relaxed atmosphere and the informal,
non-traumatic proceeding intended and provided by juvenile statutes
depend far more on the manner, tone of voice and understanding of the
judge than upon the presence or absence of any particular paraphernalia
in the hearing room.
Every petition filed in the Baltimore Juvenile Court and served
on the juvenile and his family advises in writing that the parent or
guardian may employ a lawyer to represent the child, may have the
court summons witnesses, and may pray a jury trial. This statutory
provision for jury trials in juvenile cases is almost unique in this
country. If no counsel is retained, the judge acting in loco parentis can
with propriety assist them in the non-adversary proceeding, without
essaying the dual role of judge and defense counsel.
The investigative report of social workers is never presented to
the judge until after he has found a youth delinquent. Between the
date of the hearing and the disposition of the case, such reports are
22. The following is a reproduction of the language used in a Juvenile Court Peti-
tion to advise the youth and his parents of the charge and of their rights:
To PARENTS OR GUARDIAN:
This is a summons for you to be present in Court and to produce the child
charged herein at the time stated on the reverse side of this petition. It is advis-
able that both parents attend this hearing.
The Rules of Court provide for a jury trial in all cases in the Division for
Juvenile Causes, if election therefor shall be in writing and filed with the Clerk
before the case is called for trial.
The Court will summons any witnesses, including character witnesses, whom
you wish to appear in Court and testify for you. List their names and addresses
on the witness sheet attached and return it promtply in the attached self-
addressed envelope.
You may hire a lawyer to represent your child if you wish to do so. If you
do, be sure to show this paper to him.
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made available to his counsel of record. If counsel requests, another
hearing is scheduled, and the social worker is required to take the
witness stand subject to cross-examination.
Whenever a probation officer charges that the youth has violated
his probation, he sets forth in writing the details of the alleged viola-
tion. A copy is duly served on the youth and his parents. A hearing is
scheduled, the probation officer takes the witness stand, as do his
witnesses, and all are duly cross-examined by the juvenile and his
parents who are then given the right to testify. When the family has
a lawyer, he, of course, conducts the defense.
The juvenile court hearings in Baltimore are not star chamber
proceedings. All parties in interest and their witnesses attend. While
the general public is not present, representatives from Baltimore hos-
pitals, schools, colleges and civic associations interested in child welfare
are frequently present. Court news reporters from all local newspapers
are allowed to be present at juvenile trials. They give no names of the
children involved or details whereby they may be identified, but are
otherwise free to report the hearings, which is frequently done. A court
reporter is present to take down all testimony in cases set for hearing
before the judge. In cases heard by the Masters, a court reporter is
not present, although one should be provided.23 The juvenile court
docket is, of course, a public record.
During the past twenty years, the Circuit Court of Baltimore City,
Division for Juvenile Causes, has had before it more than 54,000 cases
charging juvenile delinquency. Many hundreds of lawyers have
appeared in these hearings. In two decades, there has not been an
appeal from a decision to the Maryland Court of Appeals, nor has any
lawyer requested the court to waive jurisdiction to the criminal court so
that his young client might have a public trial and the benefit of certain
constitutional safeguards available to those accused of crime. Neither
has any aggrieved citizen petitioner, or victim of costly vandalism, or
his counselor, asked such waiver so that the "young hoodlum" can be
dealt with more realistically. While I am deeply conscious of real gaps
between the high aims of the court and its day-by-day performance,
I nevertheless believe that the absence of appeals during the last twenty
years is a significant factor in appraising the attitude of Baltimore
lawyers toward the juvenile court. It would seem that this record of
no appeals is a manifestation by such attorneys that they believe the
basic purposes of the Juvenile Court Act can be and are being carried
out, while the inherent rights of the youth and his family and the com-
munity's interest in protection against vandalism and assaults are
being safeguarded.
The late Roscoe Pound, one of America's foremost authorities onjurisprudence during the first half of this century, felt that the juvenile
court was the greatest step forward in the administration of justice
since the Magna Carta. 24 As he pointed out, the long over-due revision
23. A reporter is necessary in this situation in order to preserve a record from
which an appeal may be taken. There may also be the need for a rehearing before
the judge, and a record is necessary in such instances.
24. Glueck, Roscoe Pound and Criminal Justice, 10 CRI AND DL. 299, 336(1964).
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of antiquated rules of criminal procedure; the pre-sentence investiga-
tion; the growing recognition of the value of case work, psychiatry,
and psychology by adult courts; the indeterminate sentence; and the
wider use of probation by our more progressive criminal courts were
all born in the juvenile court and adopted by other courts after their
effectiveness had been tested there.
CONCLUSION
The juvenile court can achieve the salutary aims of its founders
within the framework of the law, recognizing the legal rights of the
youths, their parents and the community. To reach this goal, however,
the informal practice of the juvenile court, designed to promote mutual
confidence among judge, child, and family, and to provide an encourag-
ing climate for the law's new partner, the behavioral sciences, must
not relieve the judge of his responsibility to honor legal principles in-
herent in a fair civil hearing. How can this best be done?
Guidelines for Correct Juvenile Court Procedure
I.
Whenever state legislatures have enacted loosely worded juvenile
statutes abounding in sweeping generalities, the statutes should be
amended. Delinquency, dependency, and neglect, as grounds for the
court's jurisdiction, should be specifically defined. The court is charged
by law to act in the interest of the youth, but the charge applies only to
the child over whom the court has authority, i.e., a youth legally deter-
mined to be within its jurisdiction as set forth in the juvenile court
statute. Guidelines are available in the Standard Juvenile Court Act.25
Most states have, like Maryland, followed in the main the provisions
of the Standard Act, thereby greatly lessening the chance of prejudicial
error resulting in reversal. The statute should require a record of the
proceedings from which it can be seen what has been done, and how,
and on what basis. It should, of course, provide for a review through
appeal.
II.
Each juvenile court should carefully draw its Rules of Court to
clarify the requirements of the ex parte petition bringing the youth to
court and to pinpoint the procedure for giving notice of the hearing to
the family. The petition should set forth the facts upon which the
charge is based in clear, non-technical language. The rules should also
set forth other procedural requirements that guarantee the juvenile a
full and fair hearing. Such rules have the force and effect of law for
the juvenile court.
25. 5 NPPA J. 105 (1959).
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III.
Juvenile statutes should provide, as the Standard Juvenile Court
Act recommends, that the juvenile court be a court of highest general
trial jurisdiction. This will help assure that the juvenile court judge is
trained in law, in full-time employ, and aware of the meaning and
importance of due process as it has developed through many years in
equity and other civil and criminal proceedings. Equity powers his-
torically have been exercised only by the highest trial court. Experi-
enced lawyers readily recognize that procedural safeguards and due
process, as known in Equity Court practice, are the sine qua non of
good juvenile court practice. They know-better than part time, politi-
cally appointed juvenile magistrates with short tenure-that the juvenile
hearing, properly conducted, can be a very vital part of the treatment
process. The character of the proceeding itself often contributes to
respect for the law and aids in reclaiming the errant youth for useful
citizenship. When the juvenile court is a court of highest general trial
jurisdiction, there is greater probability that the judge assigned will
know the importance of hearing both sides fully, of acting on evidence
of logical probative force, and of separating the functions of accuser,
prosecutor and judge. The tough and continuing task of securing
adequate court staff and facilities is made easier by the court's position
in the judicial hierarchy.
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